The theory behind decriminalization is appealing: stop wasting resources on minor offenses, reduce mass incarceration, and redirect police toward serious crime. In practice, however, the results have consistently contradicted the theory — because the theory ignores the role of deterrence and the cascading effects of visible disorder.

Oregon's Measure 110 is the most comprehensive American test case. Passed in 2020, it decriminalized possession of small amounts of all drugs, replacing criminal penalties with a maximum $100 fine and a health assessment hotline. The results were devastating. Overdose deaths in Oregon increased 43% in the first year after implementation — among the worst increases in the nation. The health assessment hotline went largely unused: only 1% of people who received citations called. In 2024, Oregon's legislature recriminalized drug possession with overwhelming bipartisan support, acknowledging the experiment had failed.

Similar patterns emerged with property crime decriminalization. California's Proposition 47, passed in 2014, reclassified theft under $950 from a felony to a misdemeanor. Subsequent data from the Public Policy Institute of California showed property crime increases in the years following passage. Retail theft became so brazen — with organized groups conducting mass "flash mob" robberies — that major retailers began closing stores in San Francisco and other California cities. Walgreens closed 17 San Francisco locations between 2019 and 2023, citing rampant theft.

The progressive response is usually that correlation is not causation and that other factors explain crime increases. But the pattern is remarkably consistent across jurisdictions. Cities that reduced enforcement of quality-of-life offenses — public drug use, shoplifting, subway fare evasion, public urination — saw escalating disorder. This aligns with the "broken windows" theory, empirically supported by research from Harvard and other institutions, that visible disorder signals a lack of consequences and invites further criminal behavior.

The incarceration cost argument also requires scrutiny. It's true that incarceration is expensive — approximately $35,000 per year per inmate nationally. But the costs of unchecked crime — in property losses, reduced economic activity, neighborhood decline, and human suffering — can exceed incarceration costs many times over. A RAND Corporation study estimated that the total social costs of substance abuse (including crime, lost productivity, and healthcare) exceeded $600 billion annually.

Smart criminal justice reform is worth pursuing: diversion programs, drug courts, alternatives to incarceration for non-violent offenders. But wholesale decriminalization — removing consequences without building effective alternatives — has been tried and has failed. The evidence is clear.